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French Belligerence in the Face of German Reconstruction: 
1945-1947 
Todd Stocke 
The close of World War Two brought new challenges to foreign 
relations between France and the United States. The Germans' quick 
defeat of France in 1940 caused a significant drop in French prestige and 
world power. America, meanwhile, asserted itself as a major agent in 
foreign affairs, especially in Europe. At the heart of relations between the 
two countries was the inevitable postwar German question. France, having 
been invaded by Germany three times in seventy years, greatly feared 
rebuilding the German menace. No longer could France exist "under the 
threat of war from a neighboring state which had so often demonstrated 
its taste and its talent for conquest," wrote Charles de Gaulle) Due to its 
diminished powers, however, French goals regarding postwar Germany 
would prove difficult to achieve. In 1945, despite its lowered status, 
France received a zone of occupation in Germany and a vote on the 
occupation powers' Allied Control Council. French veto power in the 
Control Council quickly became the crux of policy disputes between 
France and the United States. Behind the policies of both nations lay not 
only a fear of German resurgence, but also the new fear of communism 
and the Soviet Union. French belligerency during the German 
occupation was not only a source of American frustration, but also proved 
to be a factor in the East-West split of Europe and the Cold War which 
followed. 
Near the end of World War Two, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States convened in their "Big lllree" conferences to discuss the 
postwar world. France was not invited to join. France considered non­
invitation a slight, and, augmented by the personalities of their leaders, it 
became an nitial source of friction between the United States and France. 
Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Provisional Governme Franklin 
Roosevelt was the reason France was not included in the Yalta Conference. 
"I could not doubt," wrote de Gaulle, "that the explicit refusal came from 
President Roosevelt."2 
United States Secretary of State James Byrnes, however, tells a 
different story of the attitudes toward France at Yalta. During discussion 
of whether to give France a German occupation zone, he says it was 
Russian Marshal Stalin who showed open opposition to the French and de 
Gaulle. Roosevelt apparently had to be persuaded by his advisers to 
wholly support France, but he was not the force behind Big Three 
exclusion. Complaining that de Gaulle would soon demand entrance to 
the Big Three conferences, Byrnes quotes Stalin as saying, 
1 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, trans. 
Johnathan Griffm and Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964),719. 
2 de Gaulle, Memoirs, 759. 
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[Even though] France had not done much fighting in the war, yet 
de Gaulle has demanded equal rights with the Soviets, the British 
and the Americans, who have done the fighting.3 
The discrepancy between the memoirs of Byrnes and de Gaulle on French 
exclusion is evident. It is difficult, however, to remove national biases 
from the writing of the two men, thus making difficult a definite 
determination of the cause of French exclusion. The point to understand, 
though, is the mutual distaste de Gaulle and Roosevelt held toward each 
other and the ramifications it would have on the two countries' future 
cooperation. 
The Big Three met in Potsdam in July and August, 1945, to further 
discuss the German problem. Once again the French were excluded. The 
conference created an Allied policy toward Germany despite France's 
absence, a policy with which the French had grievances. Upon invitation 
to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers,4 the French 
Delegation responded to the Potsdam agreements. Specifically, the 
delegation stated, 
These reservations refer to the contemplated restoration of a 
central Government in Germany, the reconstitution of political 
parties throughout Germany and the setting up of central admin­
istrative departments headed by State Secretaries whose authority 
would extend over the whole of German territory.5 
It was precisely the exclusion of France from these German 
decisions which caused great problems in their implementation for the 
next two years. Simply put, because the French were not at Potsdam, they 
were not bound to any decisions made there. The veto they possessed on 
the Allied Control Council proved to be a powerful weaJX?n. 
French fear of a strong Germany was immense after the war. Foreign 
Minister Georges Bidault referred to the German peril as a phantom, 
saying, " ... be aware that if the phantom is given the opportunity, it will 
once again put on flesh."6 French opposition to the Potsdam agreements 
focused on not allowing Germany to regain its strength through the 
resources it possessed within its borders. As Potsdam had not determined 
the fate of Germany's western frontier, France was determined to use its 
Control Council veto to block "any action prejUdging that area's future" 
until the Council of Foreign Ministers made a decision on the matter.7 
Thus, the French chose to block "the establishment of central German 
3 James F. Byrnes, Speakina Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),25. 
4 China was the fifth country included in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
5 U.S. Dept of State, Foreiin Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: 
General: Political and Economic Matters: 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967), 177. 
6 Georges Bidault, "Agreement on Germany: Key to World Peace," Foreign Affairs 
24:4 (July 1946): 578.
 
7 U.S. Dept. of State, General: Political and Economic Matters. 179.
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American Military Governor for Germany. Early in the stalemate, 
General Gay wrote the War Department that "further delay in establishing 
central administrative machinery was in fact defeating the purpose of 
Allied Control Council."15 He then proceeded to recommend bypassing 
the French through interzonal agreements with Britain and Russia. 16 
Clay's frustration with France led him to suggest drastic actions to coerce 
French compliance. During a food shortage in the French zone, Clay 
asserted that French cooperation "might well have eased the situation," and 
suggests that aid should be contingent on "a change of attitude by France 
to quadripartite government. "17 
Nearly three months later, in April 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and 
Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson in frustration, 
Recommend French be informed that unless they prepare to 
concur immediately in establishment of such centralized 
administrative agencies, all shipments of wheat to French zone of 
Germany will be discontinued, and furthermore, shipments (of) 
wheat to France will also be discontinued if French still unwilling 
to agree. 1S 
Clay's recommendation was refused. As late as July, 1947, France was still 
delaying American efforts, this time regarding the setting of a level of 
indUStry, and of coal organization in the Ruhr. "It is well known we have 
receded in the face of French position," Clay told Washington, "Soviet 
propaganda is already capitaliZing."19 General Clay continued by asking 
to resign, saying, "Two years has convinced me we cannot have common 
German policy with the French." As long as the French resisted, there 
could be no economic recovery in Germany.20 Clay's secret communi­
cations represent the embarrassment and anger American leaders felt 
which they could not, or would not, betray in their official 
communications with their allies, the French. 
Underlying the policies and official statements of both France and the 
United States was a fear of communism. the Soviet influence, and Soviet 
military power. As early as September of 1945. Jefferson Caffery. U.S. 
Ambassador to France. wrote Secretary Byrnes that the French feared a 
central German government because "such a central government will 
eventually be dominated by the Russians and they will have the Soviets on 
their frontiers. "21 The validity of his statement was affirmed two months 
15 The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward
 
Smith. vol. 1 (Bloomington. IN: Indiana University. 1974). 85.
 
16 Ibid.
 
17 Ibid.• 152.
 
18 Ibid.. 190.
 
19 Ibid.• 386.
 
20 Ibid.• 387.
 
21 U. S. Dept. of State. ForeiiD Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers'
 
European Adyisory Commission: Austria: Geonany. 1945 (Washington: U. S.
 
Government Printing Office. 1968). 878.
 
later in a conversation he had w. 
to fight the strong Communist P: 
their obstructionism, the French I 
to a planned restoration of Gem 
the French Communists could B 
over. American struggles agaill 
Germany, for, as General Gay Wi 
almost certain to result in a coml 
The slow resolution to the st 
Secretary of State Byrnes' speech 
Stuttgart speeCh has been desc 
American policy formulation for 
relations with France, Byrnes' sp 
on the French demands regardit 
conceded the French claims to thl 
not favor any controls that woull 
political domination or manipul~ 
fears, Byrnes also pledged the in( 
Byrnes found the French wei 
of their Saar claims and pledge tc 
and the Americans were in the pi 
at the time, and Byrnes admitte 
toward inducing the French to joi 
politically successful because Rus 
the Saar. During 1947, Franc 
autonomous Rhineland and Roo 
opposition to centralization po 
March and April of 1947, markaj 
War. Russian Foreign Minister 
proposals. which "helped persua 
West. "29 France had won a moe 
and eventually would join its zo: 
The Cold War split had begun; 
United States. 
Both the United States and F 
toward reconstruction of German 
22 Ibid.• 890.
 
23 Lucius D. Clay. 391.
 
24 John Gimbel, The American OccUJ
 
1945-1949 (Stanford. CA: Stanford V
 
25 Byrnes. Speakin~ Frankly, 191.
 
26 Ibid.• 193. 
27 Ibid.• 197. 
28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. France an 
the Present. trans. Derek CollInan (C 
29 F. Roy Willis. France. Geonany 
Cal.: Stanford University. 1965). 19. 
... "._~-,._-.-_--------------
4
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol6/iss1/9
30 
~rmany. Early in the stalemate, 
It that "further delay in establishing 
: in fact defeating the purpose of 
roceeded to recommend bypassing 
ments with Britain and Russia. 16 
to suggest drastic actions to coerce 
mortage in the French zone, Clay 
t well have eased the situation," and 
on "a change of attitude by France 
.pril 1946, Clay wrote Byrnes and 
rson in frustration, 
:med that unless they prepare to 
ablishment of such centralized 
ipments of wheat to French zone of 
1 and furthermore, shipments (of) 
i~ontinued if French still unwilling 
..s late as July, 1947, France was still 
regarding the setting of a level of 
Ie Ruhr. "It is well known we have 
In,'' Clay told Washington, "Soviet 
~ General Clay continued by asking 
vinced me we cannot have common 
; long as the French resisted, there 
iermany.20 Clay's secret communi­
t and anger American leaders felt 
d not, betray in their official 
~rench. 
,al statements of both France and the 
sm, the Soviet influence, and Soviet 
>er of 1945, Jefferson Caffery, U.S. 
U)' Byrnes that the French feared a 
~ "such a central government will 
IDS and they will have the Soviets on 
statement was affirmed two months 
; Germany 1945-1949, ed. Jean Edward 
fDiversity, 1974), 85. 
of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: 
ia;, GermanY· 1945 (Washington: U. S. 
~ 
'.
;;~
3 1 
later in a conversation he had with General de Gaulle.22 France also had 
to fight the strong Communist Party within its own borders. Throughout 
their obstructionism, the French Government claimed that if they "yielded 
to a planned restoration of Germany either economically of politically," 
the French Communists could gain the support of the people and take 
over. American struggles against communism rode on the saving of 
Germany, for, as General Clay wrote in 1947, "a communistic Germany is 
almost certain to result in a communistic Europe."23 
The slow resolution to the stalemate over Germany did not begin until 
Secretary of State Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. The 
Stuttgart speech has been described as "a landmark or watershed of 
American policy formulation for the occupation period."24 Significant to 
relations with France, Byrnes' speech finally announced the U.S. position 
on the French demands regarding western Germany territories. Byrnes 
conceded the French claims to the Saar, but then stated that America "will 
not favor any controls that would subject the Ruhr and Rhineland to the 
political domination or manipulation of outside powers."25 Easing other 
fears, Byrnes also pledged the indefinite occupation of American troops. 
Byrnes found the French were favorable to the United States' support 
of their Saar claims and pledge to keep troops in Germany.26 The British 
and the Americans were in the process of merging their occupation zones 
at the time, and Byrnes admitted that the Stuttgart speech was aimed 
toward inducing the French to join the merger.27 His move would prove 
politically successful because Russia continued to oppose French claims to 
the Saar. During 1947, France slowly abandoned the idea of an 
autonomous Rhineland and Ruhr. Bidault also began to relax French 
opposition to centralization policies.28 The Moscow conference, in 
March and April of 1947, marked the final turning point toward the Cold 
War. Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov opposed French 
proposals, which "helped persuade France to throw in its lot with the 
West."29 France had won a modest compromise in acquiring the Saar, 
and eventually would join its zone with the British and the Americans. 
The Cold War split had begun and France became a close ally of the 
United States. 
Both the United States and France practiced a policy of stubbornness 
toward reconstruction of Germany. While France repeatedly refused to 
22 Ibid., 890.
 
23 Lucius D. Clay, 391.
 
24 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of GermanY: Politics and the Military.
 
1945-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1968),85.
 
25 Byrnes, Speakin2 Frankly, 191. 
26 Ibid., 193. 
27 Ibid., 197. 
28 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to 
the Present trans. Derek Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 177. 
29 F. Roy Willis, France. GermanY and the New Europe: 1945-1963 (Stanford, 
Cal.: Stanford University, 1965), 19. 
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adhere to the Potsdam agreements, America did not falter in its attempts to 
implement them. Through its stubbornness, however, France regained 
much of its power and status in world affairs. Considering the numerous 
French colonies around the globe, it was very important at the time to 
regain such recognition. The French became a much needed friend to the 
United States on the European continent. Behind the doctrines of both 
countries had been the desire to halt communism, and now, for better or 
for worse, they would stand together on the same side of the Cold War's 
"containment" policy. 
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